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Abstract
We study multiplayer quantitative reachability games played on a finite directed graph, where the
objective of each player is to reach his target set of vertices as quickly as possible. Instead of the
well-known notion of Nash equilibrium (NE), we focus on the notion of subgame perfect equilibrium
(SPE), a refinement of NE well-suited in the framework of games played on graphs. It is known that
there always exists an SPE in quantitative reachability games and that the constrained existence
problem is decidable. We here prove that this problem is PSPACE-complete. To obtain this result,
we propose a new algorithm that iteratively builds a set of constraints characterizing the set of SPE
outcomes in quantitative reachability games. This set of constraints is obtained by iterating an
operator that reinforces the constraints up to obtaining a fixpoint. With this fixpoint, the set of
SPE outcomes can be represented by a finite graph of size at most exponential. A careful inspection
of the computation allows us to establish PSPACE membership.
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1 Introduction
While two-player zero-sum games played on graphs are the most studied model to formalize
and solve the reactive synthesis problem [26], recent work has considered non-zero-sum
extensions of this mathematical framework, see e.g. [15, 19, 7, 22, 6, 5, 17, 4, 1], see also the
surveys [21, 3, 13]. In the zero-sum game approach, the system and the environment are
considered as monolithic and fully adversarial entities. Unfortunately, both assumptions may
turn to be too strong. First, the reactive system may be composed of several components
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that execute concurrently and have their own purpose. So, it is natural to model such
systems with multiplayer games with each player having his own objective. Second, the
environment usually has its own objective too, and this objective is usually not the negation
of the objective of the reactive system as postulated in the zero-sum case. Therefore, there
are instances of the reactive synthesis problem for which no solution exists in the zero-sum
setting, i.e. no winning strategy for the system against a completely antagonistic environment,
while there exists a strategy for the system which enforces the desired properties against all
rational behaviors of the environment pursuing its own objective.
While the central solution concept in zero-sum games is the notion of winning strategy,
it is well known that this concept is not sufficient to reason about non-zero-sum games. In
non-zero-sum games, notions of equilibria are used to reason about the rational behavior of
players. The celebrated notion of Nash equilibrium (NE) [24] is one of the most studied. A
strategy profile is an NE if no player has an incentive to deviate, i.e. change his strategy and
obtain a better reward, when this player knows that the other players will be playing their
respective strategies in the profile. A well-known weakness of NE in sequential games, which
include infinite duration games played on graphs, is that they are subject to non-credible
threats: decisions in subgames that are irrational and used to threaten the other players and
oblige them to follow a given behavior. To avoid this problem, the concept of subgame perfect
equilibria (SPE) has been proposed, see e.g. [25]. SPEs are NEs with the additional property
that they are also NEs in all subgames of the original game. While it is now quite well
understood how to handle NEs algorithmically in games played on graphs [28, 29, 12, 17],
this is not the case for SPEs.
Contributions. In this paper, we provide an algorithm to decide in polynomial space the
constrained existence problem for SPEs in quantitative reachability games. A quantitative
reachability game is played by n players on a finite graph in which each player has his own
reachability objective. The objective of each player is to reach his target set of vertices
as quickly as possible. In a series of papers devoted to quantitative reachability games, it
has been shown that SPEs always exist [8], and that the set of SPE outcomes is a regular
language which is effectively constructible [11]. As a consequence of the latter result, the
constrained existence problem for SPEs is decidable.
Unfortunately, the proof that establishes the regularity of the set of possible SPE outcomes
in [11] exploits a well-quasi order for proving termination that cannot be used to obtain a
good upper bound on the complexity for the algorithm. Here, we propose a new algorithm
and we show that this set of outcomes can be represented using an automaton of size at
most exponential. It follows that the constrained existence problem for SPEs is in PSPACE.
We also provide a matching lower-bound showing that this problem is PSPACE-complete.
Our new algorithm iteratively builds a set of constraints that exactly characterize the set
of SPEs in quantitative reachability games. This set of constraints is obtained by iterating
an operator that reinforces the constraints up to obtaining a fixpoint. A careful inspection
of the computation allows us to establish PSPACE membership.
Related work. Algorithms to reason on NEs in graph games are studied in [28] for ω-regular
objectives and in [29, 12] for quantitative objectives. Algorithms to reason on SPEs are
given in [27] for ω-regular objectives. Quantitative reachability objectives are not ω-regular
objectives. Reasoning about NEs and SPEs for ω-regular specifications can also be done
using strategy logics [16, 23]. Other notions of rationality used for reactive synthesis have
been studied in the literature: rational synthesis in cooperative [19] and adversarial [22]
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setting, and their algorithmic complexity in [17]. Extensions with imperfect information have
been investigated in [18]. Synthesis rules based on the notion of admissible strategies have
been studied in [2, 7, 6, 5, 4, 1]. Weak SPEs have been studied in [11, 14, 9] and shown to
be equivalent to SPEs for quantitative reachability objectives. Fixpoint techniques are used
in [20, 11, 14] to establish the existence of (weak) SPEs in some classes of games, however
they cannot be used in our context to get complexity results.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we recall the notions of quantitative reachability game and subgame perfect
equilibrium. We also state the problem studied in this paper and our main result.
Quantitative reachability games. An arena is a tuple G = (Π, V, (Vi)i∈Π, E) where Π =
{1, 2, . . . , n} is a finite set of n players, V is a finite set of vertices with |V | ≥ 2, (Vi)i∈Π
is a partition of V between the players, and E ⊆ V × V is a set of edges such that for all
v ∈ V there exists v′ ∈ V such that (v, v′) ∈ E. Without loss of generality, we suppose that
|Π| ≤ |V |. We denote by Succ(v) = {v′ | (v, v′) ∈ E} the set of successors of v, for v ∈ V ,
and by Succ∗ the transitive closure of Succ.
A play in G is an infinite sequence of vertices ρ = ρ0ρ1 . . . such that for all k ∈ N,
(ρk, ρk+1) ∈ E. A history is a finite sequence h = h0h1 . . . hk with k ∈ N defined similarly.
The length |h| of h is the number k of its edges. We denote the set of plays by Plays and
the set of histories by Hist (when it is necessary, we use notation PlaysG and HistG to recall
the underlying arena G). Moreover, the set Histi is the set of histories such that their last
vertex v is a vertex of player i, i.e. v ∈ Vi.
Given a play ρ ∈ Plays and k ∈ N, the prefix ρ0ρ1 . . . ρk of ρ is denoted by ρ≤k and its
suffix ρkρk+1 . . . by ρ≥k. A play ρ is called a lasso if it is of the form ρ = h`ω with h` ∈ Hist.
Notice that ` is not necessary a simple cycle. The length of a lasso h`ω is the length of h`.
A quantitative game G = (G, (Costi)i∈Π) is an arena equipped with a cost function profile
Cost = (Costi)i∈Π such that each function Costi : Plays→ R ∪ {+∞} assigns a cost to each
play. In a quantitative game G, an initial vertex v0 ∈ V is often fixed, and we call (G, v0)
an initialized game. A play (resp. a history) of (G, v0) is then a play (resp. a history) of G
starting in v0. The set of such plays (resp. histories) is denoted by Plays(v0) (resp. Hist(v0)).
We also use notation Histi(v0) when these histories end in a vertex v ∈ Vi.
In this article we are interested in quantitative reachability games such that each player
has a target set of vertices that he wants to reach. The cost to pay is equal to the number of
edges to reach the target set, and each player aims at minimizing his cost.
I Definition 1 (Quantitative reachability game). A quantitative reachability game (or simply
a reachability game) is a tuple G = (G, (Fi)i∈Π, (Costi)i∈Π) such that (i) G is an arena,
(ii) for each i ∈ Π, Fi ⊆ V is the target set of player i, and (iii) for each i ∈ Π and each
ρ = ρ0ρ1 . . . ∈ Plays, Costi(ρ) is equal to the least index k such that ρk ∈ Fi, and to +∞ if
no such index exists.
Given a quantitative game G, a strategy for player i is a function σi : Histi → V . It
assigns to each history hv, with v ∈ Vi, a vertex v′ such that (v, v′) ∈ E. In an initialized
game (G, v0), σi needs only to be defined for histories starting in v0. A play ρ = ρ0ρ1 . . . is
consistent with σi if for all ρk ∈ Vi, σi(ρ0 . . . ρk) = ρk+1. A strategy σi is positional if it only
depends on the last vertex of the history, i.e., σi(hv) = σi(v) for all hv ∈ Histi.
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A strategy profile is a tuple σ = (σi)i∈Π of strategies, one for each player. Given an
initialized game (G, v0) and a strategy profile σ, there exists a unique play from v0 consistent
with each strategy σi. We call this play the outcome of σ and denote it by 〈σ〉v0 . Let
c = (ci)i∈Π ∈ (N∪ {+∞})|Π|, we say that σ is a strategy profile with cost c or that 〈σ〉v0 has
cost c if ci = Costi(〈σ〉v0) for all i ∈ Π.
Solution concepts and constraint problem. In the multiplayer game setting, the solution
concepts usually studied are equilibria (see [21]). We here recall the concepts of Nash
equilibrium and subgame perfect equilibrium.
Let σ = (σi)i∈Π be a strategy profile in a game (G, v0). When we highlight the role
of player i, we denote σ by (σi, σ−i) where σ−i is the profile (σj)j∈Π\{i}. A strategy
σ′i 6= σi is a deviating strategy of player i, and it is a profitable deviation for him if
Costi(〈σ〉v0) > Costi(〈σ′i, σ−i〉v0).
The notion of Nash equilibrium is classical: a strategy profile σ in an initialized game
(G, v0) is a Nash equilibrium (NE) if no player has an incentive to deviate unilaterally from
his strategy, i.e. no player has a profitable deviation. Formally, σ is an NE if for each i ∈ Π
and each deviating strategy σ′i of player i, we have Costi(〈σ〉v0) ≤ Costi(〈σ′i, σ−i〉v0).
When considering games played on graphs, a useful refinement of NE is the concept of
subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) which is a strategy profile being an NE in each subgame.
It is well-known that contrarily to NEs, SPEs avoid non-credible threats [21]. Formally,
given a quantitative game G = (G,Cost), an initial vertex v0, and a history hv ∈ Hist(v0),
the initialized game (Gh, v) is called a subgame of (G, v0) such that Gh = (G,Costh) and
Costih(ρ) = Costi(hρ) for all i ∈ Π and ρ ∈ V ω. Notice that (G, v0) is subgame of itself.
Moreover if σi is a strategy for player i in (G, v0), then σih denotes the strategy in (Gh, v)
such that for all histories h′ ∈ Histi(v), σih(h′) = σi(hh′). Similarly, from a strategy profile
σ in (G, v0), we derive the strategy profile σh in (Gh, v).
I Definition 2 (Subgame perfect equilibrium). A strategy profile σ is a subgame perfect
equilibrium in an initialized game (G, v0) if for all hv ∈ Hist(v0), σh is an NE in (Gh, v).
It is proved in [8] that there always exists an SPE in reachability games. In this paper,
we are interested in solving the following constraint problem.
I Definition 3 (Constraint problem). Given (G, v0) an initialized reachability game and two
threshold vectors x, y ∈ (N ∪ {+∞})|Π|, the constraint problem is to decide whether there
exists an SPE in (G, v0) with cost c such that x ≤ c ≤ y, that is, xi ≤ ci ≤ yi for all i ∈ Π.
Our main result is the following one. The paper is devoted to its proof.
I Theorem 4. The constraint problem for initialized reachability games is PSPACE-complete.
I Example 5. A reachability game G with two players is depicted in Figure 1. The circle
(resp. square) vertices are owned by player 1 (resp. player 2). The target sets of both players
are respectively F1 = {v2} (grey vertex) and F2 = {v2, v5} (double circled vertices).
The positional strategy profile σ = (σ1, σ2) is depicted by double arrows, its outcome
in (G, v0) is equal to 〈σ〉v0 = (v0v1v6v7v2)ω with cost (4, 4). Let us explain that σ is an
NE. Player 1 reaches his target set as soon as possible and has thus no incentive to deviate.
Player 2 has no profitable deviation that allows him to reach v5. For instance if he uses a
deviating positional strategy σ′2 such that σ′2(v0) = v4, then the outcome of (σ1, σ′2) is equal
to (v0v4)ω with cost (+∞,+∞) which is not profitable for player 2. One can verify that
the strategy profile σ is also an SPE. For instance in the subgame (Gh, v5) with h = v0v4,
we have ρ = 〈σh〉v5 = v5v4(v0v1v6v7v2)ω such that Costh(ρ) = Cost(hρ) = (8, 2). In this
subgame, with ρ, both players reach their target set as soon as possible. J
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v5 v4 v0 v1 v6 v7
v2
v3
Figure 1 A quantitative reachability game: player 1 (resp. player 2) owns circle (resp. square)
vertices and F1 = {v2} and F2 = {v2, v5}.
Extended game. We here present the extended game of a reachability game, such that the
vertices are enriched with the set of players that have already visited their target sets along a
history (see e.g. [9]). Working with this extended game is essential to prove our main result.
I Definition 6 (Extended game). Let G = (G, (Fi)i∈Π, (Costi)i∈Π) be a reachability game
with an arena G = (Π, V, (Vi)i∈Π, E), and let v0 be an initial vertex. The extended game
of G is equal to X = (X, (FXi )i∈Π, (Costi)i∈Π) with the arena X = (Π, V X , (V Xi )i∈Π, EX),
such that:
V X = V × 2Π
((v, I), (v′, I ′)) ∈ EX if and only if (v, v′) ∈ E and I ′ = I ∪ {i ∈ Π | v′ ∈ Fi}
(v, I) ∈ V Xi if and only if v ∈ Vi
(v, I) ∈ FXi if and only if i ∈ I
for each ρ ∈ PlaysX , Costi(ρ) is equal to the least index k such that ρk ∈ FXi , and to
+∞ if no such index exists.
The initialized extended game (X , x0) associated with the initialized game (G, v0) is such that
x0 = (v0, I0) with I0 = {i ∈ Π | v0 ∈ Fi}.
Notice the way each target set FXi is defined: if v ∈ Fi, then (v, I) ∈ FXi but also
(v′, I ′) ∈ FXi for all (v′, I ′) ∈ Succ
∗(v, I). The extended game of the reachability game of
Figure 1 is depicted in Figure 2 (until Section 3 the reader should not consider the labeling
indicated close to the vertices). We will come back to this example at the end of this section.
Let us state some properties of the extended game. First, notice that for each ρ =
(v0, I0)(v1, I1) . . . ∈ PlaysX(x0), we have the next property called I-monotonicity:
Ik ⊆ Ik+1 for all k ∈ N. (1)
Second, given an initialized game (G, v0) and its extended game (X , x0), there is a
one-to-one correspondence between plays in PlaysG(v0) and plays in PlaysX(x0):
from ρ = ρ0ρ1 . . . ∈ PlaysG(v0), we derive ρX = (ρ0, I0)(ρ1, I1) . . . ∈ PlaysX(x0) such
that Ik is the set of players i that have seen their target set Fi along ρ≤k;
from ρ = (v0, I0)(v1, I1) . . . ∈ PlaysX(x0), we derive ρG = v0v1 . . . ∈ PlaysG(v0) such that
the second components Ik, k ∈ N, are omitted.
Third, given ρ ∈ PlaysG(v0), we have that Cost(ρX) = Cost(ρ), and conversely given
ρ ∈ PlaysX(x0), we have that Cost(ρG) = Cost(ρ). It follows that outcomes of SPE can be
equivalently studied in (G, v0) and in (X , x0), as stated in the next lemma.
I Lemma 7. If ρ is the outcome of an SPE in (G, v0), then ρX is the outcome of an SPE in
(X , x0) with the same cost. Conversely, if ρ is the outcome of an SPE in (X , x0), then ρG is
the outcome of an SPE in (G, v0) with the same cost.
By construction, the arena X of the initialized extended game is divided into different
regions according to the players who have already visited their target set. Let us provide
some useful notions with respect to this decomposition. We will often use them in the
following sections. Let I = {I ⊆ Π | there exists v ∈ V such that (v, I) ∈ Succ∗(x0)} be the
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v0, ∅
4
v1, ∅
3
v6, ∅
2
v7, ∅
1
v3, ∅ +∞
v4, ∅
+∞
v5, {2}
+∞
v4, {2}
+∞
v0, {2}
0
v1, {2}
3
v6, {2}
2
v7, {2}
1
v3, {2}+∞
v2, {1, 2} 0
v0, {1, 2}
0
v1, {1, 2}
0
v6, {1, 2}
0
v7, {1, 2}
0
v3, {1, 2}
0
v4, {1, 2}
0
v5, {1, 2}
0
Figure 2 The extended game (X , x0) for the initialized game (G, v0) of Figure 1. The values of a
labeling function λ are indicated close to each vertex.
set of sets I accessible from the initial state x0, and let N = |I| be its size. For I, I ′ ∈ I
with I 6= I ′, if there exists ((v, I), (v′, I ′)) ∈ EX , we say that I ′ is a successor of I and we
write I ′ ∈ Succ(I). Given I ∈ I, XI = (V I , EI) refers to the sub-arena of X restricted to
the vertices {(v, I) ∈ V X | v ∈ V }. We say that XI is the region1 associated with I. Such a
region XI is called a bottom region whenever Succ(I) = ∅.
There exists a partial order on I such that I < I ′ if and only if I ′ ∈ Succ+(I).
We fix an arbitrary total order on I that extends this partial order < as follows:
J1 < J2 < . . . < JN . (2)
(with XJN a bottom region).2 With respect to this total order, given n ∈ {1, . . . , N}, we
denote by X≥Jn = (V ≥Jn , E≥Jn) the sub-arena of X restricted to the vertices {(v, I) ∈ V X |
I ≥ Jn}. This total order together with the I-monotonicity leads to the following lemma.
I Lemma 8 (Region decomposition and section). Let π be a (finite or infinite) path in X .
Then there exists a region decomposition of π as π[`]π[`+ 1] . . . π[m] with 1 ≤ ` ≤ m ≤ N ,
such that for each n, ` ≤ n ≤ m :
π[n] is a (possibly empty) path in X ,
every vertex of π[n] is of the form (v, Jn) for some v ∈ V .
Each path π[n] is called a section. The last section π[m] is infinite if and only if π is infinite.
I Example 9. Let us come back to the game (G, v0) of Figure 1. Its extended game (X , x0) is
depicted in Figure 2 (only the part reachable from the initial vertex x0 = (v0, ∅) is depicted).
The extended game is divided into three different regions: one region associated to I = ∅
that contains x0, a second region associated to I = {2}, and a third bottom region associated
to I = Π. Hence the set I = {∅, {2},Π} is totally ordered as J1 = ∅ < J2 = {2} < J3 = Π.
For all the vertices (v, I) of the region associated with I = {2}, we have (v, I) 6∈ FX1 and
(v, I) ∈ FX2 , and for those of the region associated with I = Π, we have (v, I) ∈ FX1 ∩ FX2 .
From the SPE σ given in Example 5 with outcome ρ = (v0v1v6v7v2)ω ∈ PlaysG(v0) and
cost (4, 4), we derive the SPE outcome ρX ∈ PlaysX(x0) with the same cost and equal to
(v0, ∅)(v1, ∅)(v6, ∅)(v7, ∅)((v2,Π)(v0,Π)(v1,Π)(v6,Π)(v7,Π))ω (3)
1 In the sequel, we indifferently call region either XI , or V I , or I.
2 We use notation Jn, n ∈ {1, . . . , N}, to avoid any confusion with the sets Ik appearing in a play
ρ = (v0, I0)(v1, I1) . . ..
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3 Characterization
In this section, given an initialized reachability game (G, v0), we characterize the set of plays
that are outcomes of SPEs, and we provide an algorithm to construct this set. For this
characterization, by Lemma 7, we can work on the extended game (X , x0) instead of (G, v0).
All along this section, when we refer to a vertex of V X , we use notation v (instead of
(u, I)) and notation I(v) means the second component I of this vertex.
Our algorithm iteratively builds a set of constraints imposed by a labeling function
λ : V X → N ∪ {+∞} such that the plays of the extended game satisfying those constraints
are exactly the SPE outcomes. Let us provide a formal definition of such a function λ with
the constraints that it imposes on plays.
I Definition 10 (λ-consistent play). Let X be the extended game of a reachability game G,
and λ : V X → N ∪ {+∞} be a labeling function. Given v ∈ V X , for all plays ρ ∈ PlaysX(v),
we say that ρ = ρ0ρ1 . . . is λ-consistent if for all n ∈ N and i ∈ Π such that ρn ∈ Vi:
Costi(ρ≥n) ≤ λ(ρn). (4)
We denote by Λ(v) the set of plays ρ ∈ PlaysX(v) that are λ-consistent.
Thus, a play ρ is λ-consistent if for all its suffixes ρ≥n, if player i owns ρn then the
number of edges to reach his target set along ρ≥n is bounded by λ(ρn). Before going into the
details of our algorithm, let us intuitively explain on an example how a well-chosen labeling
function characterizes the set of SPE outcomes.
I Example 11. We consider the extended game (X , x0) of Figure 2, and a labeling function
λ whose values are indicated under or next to each vertex. If v ∈ V Xi is labeled by λ(v) = c,
then if c ∈ N0, this means that player i will only accept outcomes in (X , v) that reach his
target set within c steps, otherwise he would have a profitable deviation. If λ(v) = 0, this
means that player i has already reached his target set, and if λ(v) = +∞, player i has no
profitable deviation whatever outcome is proposed to him.
In Example 9 was given the SPE outcome equal to ρX (3) and with cost (4, 4). We have
λ(v0, ∅) = 4 and player 2 reaches his target set from (v0, ∅) within exactly 4 steps. The
constraints imposed by λ on the other vertices of ρ are respected too. On the other hand,
one can prove that ρ′ = ((v0, ∅)(v4, ∅))ω is the outcome of no SPE. It is not λ-consistent
since player 2 does not reach his target set, and so in particular not within 4 steps. J
Our algorithm roughly works as follows: the labeling function λ that characterizes the set
of SPE outcomes is obtained (i) from an initial labeling function that imposes no constraints,
(ii) by iterating an operator that reinforces the constraints step after step, (iii) up to obtaining
a fixpoint which is the required function λ. Thus, if λk is the labeling function computed
at step k and Λk(v), v ∈ V X , the related sets of λk-consistent plays, initially we have
Λ0(v) = PlaysX(v), and step by step, the constraints imposed by λk become stronger and
the sets Λk(v) become smaller, until a fixpoint is reached.
Initially, we want a labeling function λ0 that imposes no constraint in a way to have
Λ0(v) = PlaysX(v). We define λ0(v) = +∞ except when i ∈ I(v) and v ∈ V Xi where
λ0(v) = 0. Indeed by Definition 6, we have v ∈ FXi if and only if i ∈ I(v). Hence, given
ρ = ρ0ρ1 . . ., once ρk ∈ FXi for some k ∈ N then ρn ∈ FXi for all n ≥ k. It follows that for
all n ≥ k, Costi(ρ≥n) = 0 and the inequality (4) is trivially true. (See also Example 11.)
I Definition 12 (Initial labeling). For all v ∈ V X , let i ∈ Π be such that v ∈ V Xi ,
λ0(v) = 0 if i ∈ I(v) and λ0(v) = +∞ otherwise.
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Let us now explain how our algorithm computes the labeling functions λk, k ≥ 1, and the
related sets Λk(v), v ∈ V X . It works in a bottom-up manner, according to the total order
J1 < J2 < . . . < JN of I given in (2). It first iteratively updates the labeling function for all
vertices v of the arena XJN . At some point, the values of λk do not change anymore in XJN
and (λk)k∈N reaches locally (on XJN ) a fixpoint. Then it treats the arena X≥JN−1 and in
the same way, it updates locally the values of λk in X≥JN−1 until reaching a (local) fixpoint.
It then repeats this procedure in X≥JN−2 , . . ., X≥J1 = X.
Hence suppose we currently treat the arena X≥Jn and we want to compute λk+1 from λk.
We define the updated function λk+1 as follows (with the convention that 1 + (+∞) = +∞).
I Definition 13 (Labeling update). Let k ≥ 0 and suppose that we treat the arena X≥Jn ,
with n ∈ {1, . . . , N}. For all v ∈ V X ,
if v ∈ V ≥Jn , let i ∈ Π be such that v ∈ V Xi , then
λk+1(v) = 0 if i ∈ I(v) and λk+1(v) = 1 + min
(v,v′)∈EX
sup{Costi(ρ) | ρ ∈ Λk(v′)} otherwise.
if v 6∈ V ≥Jn , then λk+1(v) = λk(v).
I Remark 14. If the sup in Definition 13 is equal to +∞ then there exists ρ ∈ Λk(v′) such
that Costi(ρ) = +∞. Thus the sup can be replaced by a max which belongs to N ∪ {+∞}.
Let us provide some explanations. As this update concerns the arena X≥Jn , we keep
λk+1 = λk outside of this arena. Suppose now that v belongs to the arena X≥Jn and v ∈ V Xi .
We define λk+1(v) = 0 whenever i ∈ I(v) (as already explained for the definition of λ0).
When it is updated, the value λk+1(v) represents what is the best cost that player i can
ensure for himself with a “one-shot” choice by only taking into account plays of Λk(v′)
with v′ ∈ Succ(v). Notice that it makes sense to run the algorithm in a bottom-up fashion
according to the total ordering J1 < . . . < JN since given a play ρ = ρ0ρ1 . . ., if ρ0 is a vertex
of V ≥Jn , then for all k ∈ N, ρk is a vertex of V ≥Jn (by I-monotonicity). Moreover running
the algorithm in this way is essential to prove that the constraint problem is in PSPACE.
We can now provide our algorithm that computes the sequence (λk(v))k∈N. From the
last computed λk, we derive the sets Λk(v), v ∈ V X , that we need for the characterization of
outcomes of SPEs (see Theorem 17 below). Such a characterization already appears in [11]
however with a different algorithm that cannot be used to obtain good complexity upper
bounds for the constraint problem as done in this paper. Nevertheless, the proof of our
characterization and that of [11] are similar.
Algorithm 1: Fixpoint.
k ← 0; n← N ; compute λ0 (see Definition 12)
while n 6= 0 do
repeat
k ← k + 1; compute λk from λk−1 with respect to X≥Jn (see Definition 13)
until λk = λk−1
n← n− 1
end
return λk.
As already announced, the sequence (λk)k∈N computed by this algorithm reaches a
fixpoint – locally on each arena X≥Jn and globally on X – in the following meaning:
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I Proposition 15. There exists a sequence 0 = k∗N < k∗N−1 < . . . < k∗1 = k∗ such that
Local fixpoint: for all Jn ∈ I, all m ∈ N and all v ∈ V ≥Jn : λk
∗
n+m(v) = λk∗n(v).
Global fixpoint: with k∗ = k∗1 , for all m ∈ N and all v ∈ V X : λk
∗+m(v) = λk∗(v).
The global fixpoint λk∗ is also simply denoted by λ∗, and the set Λk∗ is denoted by Λ∗.
The fixpoints follow from the existence of a well-quasi-ordering on the non increasing
sequences (λk(v))k∈N. Proposition 15 indicates that Algorithm 1 terminates. Indeed for each
Jn ∈ I, taking the least index k∗n such that λk
∗
n+1(v) = λk∗n(v) for every v ∈ X≥Jn shows
that the repeat loop is broken and the variable n decremented by 1. The value n = 0 is
eventually reached and the algorithm stops with the global fixpoint λ∗. Notice that the first
local fixpoint is reached with k∗N = 0 as XJN is a bottom region.
Proposition 15 also shows that when a local fixpoint is reached in the arena X≥Jn+1 and
the algorithm updates the labeling function λk in the arena X≥Jn , the values of λk(v) do not
change anymore for any v ∈ V ≥Jn+1 but can still be modified for some v ∈ V Jn . Recall also
that outside of X≥Jn , the values of λk(v) are still equal to the initial values λ0(v). These
properties will be useful when we will prove that the constraint problem for reachability
games is in PSPACE. They are summarized in the next lemma.
I Lemma 16. Let k be a step of Algorithm 1, let Jn with n ∈ {1, . . . , N}. For all v ∈ V Jn :
if k ≤ k∗n+1, then λk+1(v) = λk(v) = λ0(v),
if k∗n ≤ k, then λk+1(v) = λk(v) = λk
∗
n(v),
Hence the values of λk(v) and λk+1(v) may be different only when k∗n+1 < k < k∗n.
The following theorem states how we characterize outcomes of SPEs in (X , x0). It also
provides a characterization of the outcomes of SPEs in (G, v0) by Lemma 7.
I Theorem 17 (Characterization). Let (G, v0) be an initialized quantitative game and (X , x0)
be its extended game. Let ρ be a play in PlaysX(x0). Then ρ is the outcome of an SPE in
(X , x0) if and only if for all v ∈ Succ∗(x0), Λ∗(v) 6= ∅ and ρ ∈ Λ∗(x0).
I Example 18. Let us come back to the running example of Figure 2. The different steps
of Algorithm 1 are given in Table 1. The columns indicate the vertices according to their
region, respectively Π, {2}, and ∅. Notice that for the region Π, we only write one column v
as for all vertices (v,Π) the value of λ is equal to 0 all along the algorithm.
Recall that J1 = ∅ < J2 = {2} < J3 = Π = {1, 2}. The algorithm begins with the arena
XJ3 . A fixpoint (λ1 = λ0) is immediately reached because all vertices belong to the target
set of both players in XJ3 . Thus the first local fixpoint is reached with k∗3 = 0.
The algorithm then treats the arena X≥J2 . By Lemma 16, it is enough to consider the
region XJ2 . Let us explain how to compute λ2(v) from λ1(v) on this region. For v = (v7, {2}),
we have that λ2(v) = 1 + min(v,v′)∈EX sup{Cost1(ρ) | ρ ∈ Λ1(v′)} . As the unique successor
of v is (v2, {1, 2}), all λ1-consistent plays beginning in this successor have cost 0. So, we
have that λ2(v) = 1. For the computation of λ2(v6, {2}), the same argument holds since
(v6, {2}) has the unique successor (v7, {2}). The vertex (v1, {2}) has two successors: (v6, {2})
and (v3, {2}). Again, we know that all λ1-consistent plays beginning in (v6, {2}) have cost 2.
From (v3, {2}) however, one can easily check that the play (v3, {2})(v0, {2})((v4, {2}))ω is
λ1-consistent and has cost +∞ for player 1. Thus, we obtain that λ2(v1, {2}) = 3. For the
other vertices of XJ2 , one can see that λ2(v) = λ1(v).
Finally, we can check that the local fixed point is reached in the arena X≥J2 (resp. X≥J1)
with λ3 = λ2 (resp. λ6 = λ5 = λ∗). Therefore the respective fixpoints are reached with
k∗2 = 2 and k∗1 = 5. The labeling function indicated in Figure 2 is the one of λ∗. J
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Table 1 The different steps of the algorithm computing λ∗ for the extended game of Figure 2.
Region Π {2} ∅
v v0 v1 v6 v7 v3 v4 v5 v0 v1 v6 v7 v3 v4
λ0 = λ1 0 0 +∞ +∞ +∞ +∞ +∞ +∞ +∞ +∞ +∞ +∞ +∞ +∞
λ2 = λ3 0 0 3 2 1 +∞ +∞ +∞ +∞ +∞ +∞ +∞ +∞ +∞
λ4 0 0 3 2 1 +∞ +∞ +∞ +∞ 3 2 1 +∞ +∞
λ5 = λ∗ 0 0 3 2 1 +∞ +∞ +∞ 4 3 2 1 +∞ +∞
4 Counter graph
In this section, given a labeling function λ, we introduce the concept of counter graph such
that its infinite paths coincide with the plays that are λ-consistent. We then show that the
counter graph associated with the fixpoint function λ∗ computed by Algorithm 1 has an
exponential size, an essential step to prove PSPACE membership of the constraint problem.
For the entire section, we fix a reachability game G = (G, (Fi)i∈Π, (Costi)i∈Π) and
X = (X, (FXi )i∈Π, (Costi)i∈Π) its associated extended game.
A labeling function λ give constraints on costs of plays from each vertex in X, albeit only
for the owner of this vertex. However, by the property of λ-consistence, constraints for a
player carry over all the successive vertices, whether they belong to him or not. In order to
check efficiently this property, we introduce the counter graph to keep track explicitly of the
accumulation of constraints for all players at each step of a play. We first fix some notation.
I Definition 19 (Maximal finite range). Let λ : V X → N ∪ {+∞} be a labeling function.
We consider restrictions of λ to sub-arenas of V X as follows. Let n ∈ {1, . . . , N}, we
denote by λn : V Jn → N∪ {+∞} the restriction of λ to V Jn . Similarly we denote by λ≥n
(resp. λ>n) the restriction of λ to V ≥Jn (resp. V >Jn).
The maximal finite range of λ, denoted by mR(λ), is equal to mR(λ) = max{c ∈ N |
λ(v) = c for some v ∈ V X} with the convention that mR(λ) = 0 if λ is the constant
function +∞. We extend this notion to restrictions of λ with the convention that
mR(λ>n) = 0 if Jn is a bottom region.
Note that in the definition of maximal finite range, we only consider the finite values of λ.
I Definition 20 (Counter Graph). Let λ : V X → N ∪ {+∞} be a labeling function. Let
K := {0, . . . ,K} ∪ {+∞} with K = mR(λ). The counter graph C(λ) for G and λ is equal to
C(λ) = (Π, V C , (V Ci )i∈Π, EC), such that:
V C = V X ×K|Π|
(v, (ci)i∈Π) ∈ V Cj if and only if v ∈ V Xj
((v, (ci)i∈Π), (v′, (c′i)i∈Π)) ∈ EC if and only if:
(v, v′) ∈ EX , and
for every i ∈ Π, c′i =

0 if i ∈ I(v′)
ci − 1 if i /∈ I(v′), v′ /∈ V Xi and ci > 1
min(ci − 1, λ(v′)) if i /∈ I(v′), v′ ∈ V Xi and ci > 1.
Intuitively, the counter graph is constructed such that once a value λ(v) is finite for a
vertex v ∈ V Xi along a play in X , the corresponding path in C(λ) keeps track of the induced
constraint by (i) decrementing the counter value ci for the concerned player i by 1 at every
step, (ii) updating this counter if a stronger constraint for player i is encountered by visiting
a vertex v′ with a smaller value λ(v′), and (iii) setting the counter ci to 0 if player i has
indeed reached his target set.
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Note that there may be vertices with no outgoing edges. Indeed, consider a vertex
(v, (ci)i∈Π) ∈ V C such that cj = 1 for some player j. By construction of C(λ), the only
outgoing edges from (v, (ci)i∈Π) must link to vertices (v′, (c′i)i∈Π) such that (v, v′) ∈ EX ,
c′j = 0 and j ∈ I(v′). However, it may be that no successor v′ of v in X is such that j ∈ I(v′).
Note as well that for each vertex v ∈ V X , there exist many different vertices (v, (ci)i∈Π)
in C(λ), one for each counter values profile. However, the intended goal of C(λ) is to monitor
explicitly the constraints accumulated by each player along a play in X regarding λ. Thus,
we will only consider paths in C(λ) that start in vertices (v, (ci)i∈Π) such that the counter
values correspond indeed to the constraint at the beginning of a play in X regarding λ:
I Definition 21 (Starting vertex in C(λ)). Let v ∈ V X . We distinguish one vertex
vC = (v, (ci)i∈Π) in V C , such that for every i ∈ Π, the counter value ci is equal to 0
if i ∈ I(v), to λ(v) if i /∈ I(v) and v ∈ V Xi , and to +∞ otherwise. We call vC the starting
vertex associated with v, and denote by SV(λ) the set of all starting vertices in C(λ).
There exists a correspondence between λ-consistent plays in X and infinite paths from
starting vertices in C(λ), called valid paths, in the following way. On one hand, every play
ρ in X that is not λ-consistent does not appear in the counter graph: the first constraint
regarding λ that is violated along ρ is reflected by a vertex in C(λ) with a counter value
getting to 1 and no outgoing edges. On the other hand, λ-consistent plays in X have a
corresponding infinite path in the counter graph C(λ). This is formalized in the next lemma:
I Lemma 22. There exists a λ-consistent play ρ = ρ0ρ1 . . . in PlaysX(v) with v ∈ V X if, and
only if there exists an associated infinite path π = π0π1 . . . in C(λ) such that π0 = vC ∈ SV(λ)
and ρ is the projection of π on V X (πn is of the form (ρn, (c′i)i∈Π) for all n ∈ N).
Since the edge relation EC in C(λ) respects the edge relation EX in X , the region
decomposition of a path in X given in Lemma 8 can also be applied to a path in C(λ).
In order to prove the PSPACE membership for the constraint problem, we need to show
that the counter graph C(λ∗), with λ∗ the fixpoint function computed by Algorithm 1, has
an exponential size. To this end it is enough to show an exponential upper bound on the
maximal finite range mR(λ∗)(= mR(λk
∗
1
≥1)) of λ∗. To do so, we prove with Theorem 23, by
induction on the number of computation steps k of Algorithm 1, an exponential upper bound
on mR(λk` ) and mR(λk≥`) for every region XJ` and every step k.
I Theorem 23. For every k ∈ N and region XJ` , we have
mR(λk` ) ≤ O(|V |(|V |+3)·(|Π|+2)) and mR(λk≥`) ≤ O(|V |(|V |+3)·(|Π|+2)).
The next corollary will be useful in Section 5 where not only the maximal finite range must
be exponentially bounded, but also the cost of any play satisfying the current constraints.
I Corollary 24. Let v ∈ V X with I(v) = J` with ` < N . Let k ∈ N such that k > k∗`+1.
Suppose there exists c ∈ N such that sup {Costi(ρ) | ρ ∈ Λk(v)} = c. Then, we have:
c ≤ O(|V |(|V |+3)·(|Π|+2)).
Let us give a few ingredients of the induction of Theorem 23. For each region XJ` , the
value mR(λ0`) is always equal to 0. For the general case, the value mR(λ
k+1
` ) depends on
the values of λk+1` , which, when finite, are in turn determined by the maximal cost of the
λk-consistent plays starting in region XJ` (see Definition 13). A crucial point to obtain these
bounds is that this maximal cost corresponds to the length of the longest cycle-free prefix of
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an infinite path starting in region XJ` in C(λk). Furthermore, we can evaluate this maximal
length in terms of the values of mR(λk` ) and mR(λk>`), which are bounded by the previous
step of the induction. The following key technical lemma formalizes this idea.
I Lemma 25. Let vC be a starting vertex in SV(λ) associated with v ∈ V X such that
I(v) = J`. Let π be a finite prefix of a valid path in C(λ) such that π0 = vC and π does not
contain any cycle. Then
|π| ≤ |V |+ 2 ·mR(λ`) +
|Π|∑
r=|J`|+1
|V |+ 2 · max
Jj >J`
|Jj |=r
mR(λj).
Proof sketch. Let π be a finite prefix of a valid path in C(λ) as in the statement. Let
π[`] . . . π[m] be its region decomposition according to Lemma 8, graphically represented in
Figure 3. Let ρ be the corresponding path in X and ρ[`] . . . ρ[m] be its region decomposition.
Let us consider a fixed non-empty section π[n].
π[`]0
J`
∞ → c
π[n]0
Jn
π[m]0
Jm
Figure 3 Region decomposition of π.
Suppose first that the counter values at π[n]0 are either 0 or +∞. Let us prove that along
π[n], there can be at most |V | steps before reaching a vertex with a finite positive value of λ:
assume there is a cycle in the corresponding section ρ[n] in X such that from ρ[n]0 and
along the cycle, all the values of λ are either 0 or +∞,
by construction of C(λ), the counter values in the corresponding prefix of π[n] remain
fixed for each vertex of this prefix: as no value of λ is positive and finite, no counter value
can be decremented,
thus, the cycle in ρ[n] is also a cycle in π[n] which is impossible by hypothesis,
thus there is no such cycle in ρ[n], and as there are at most |V | vertices in region XJn ,
ρ[n] can have a prefix of length at most |V | with only values 0 or +∞ for λ, implying
that this is also the case for π[n].
Therefore, we can decompose π[n] into a (possibly empty) prefix of length at most |V |, and
a (possibly empty) suffix where at least one counter value c′i, for some i, is a positive finite
value in its first vertex v′. This frontier between prefix and suffix of π[n] is represented by a
vertical double bar ‖ with caption ∞→ c in Figure 3. This value c′i is bounded by mR(λn),
the maximal finite range of λn. From there, as the corresponding ρ is λ-consistent, player i
reaches his target set in at most c′i steps, and ρ enters a new region, which means that the
section π[n] is over. So, in that case, the length of π[n] can be bounded by |V |+ mR(λn).
Suppose now that at vertex π[n]0, there exists a counter value ci for some player i that
is neither 0 nor +∞. This means that there was a constraint for player i initialized in a
previous section π[n′], with n′ < n, that has carried over to π[n]0, via decrements of at least 1
per step. We know that the initial finite counter value is bounded by mR(λn′), and appeared
before the end of section π[n′]. Thus the length from the end of section π[n′] to the end of
section π[n] is bounded by mR(λn′), as again, once the counter value attains 0 for player i,
the path π has entered the next section.
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Therefore, considering the possible cases for each section, we can bound the total length
of π as follows: |π| ≤
∑m
j=` |V |+ 2 ·mR(λj).
Finally, remark that by I-monotonicity, it is actually the case that only (and at most) |Π|
different non-empty sections can appear in the decomposition of π. Furthermore, for each
n ∈ {`+ 1, . . . , N}, we have mR(λn) ≤ max{mR(λj) | Jj > J`, |Jj | = |Jn|} by Definition 19.
Thus, we obtain the bound stated in Lemma 25. J
5 PSPACE completeness
In this section, we prove that the constraint problem is PSPACE-complete (Theorem 4). Given
a reachability game (G,v0) and two thresholds x, y ∈ (N∪{+∞})|Π|, this problem is to decide
whether there exists an SPE σ in this game such that for all i ∈ Π, xi ≤ Costi(〈σ〉v0) ≤ yi.
As the proof of the PSPACE-hardness (based on a reduction from the QBF problem) is nearly
the same as for qualitative reachability games [10], we only prove the PSPACE-easyness.
I Proposition 26. The constraint problem for quantitative reachability games is in PSPACE.
Let us provide a high level sketch of the proof of our PSPACE procedure. Thanks to
Theorem 17, solving the constraint problem reduces in finding a λ∗-consistent play ρ in
(X , x0) satisfying the constraints. By Lemma 22, the latter problem reduces in finding a
corresponding valid path π in the counter graph C(λ∗), satisfying the constraints. Roughly
speaking, in order to solve our initial problem, it suffices to decide the existence of a valid
path that is a lasso and satisfies the constraints in the counter graph, which is exponential
in the size of our original input. Classical arguments, using Savitch’s Theorem can thus be
used to prove the PSPACE membership. Nevertheless, the detailed proof is more intricate
for two reasons. The first reason is that the counter graph is based on the labeling function
λ∗. We thus also have to prove that this function λ∗ can be computed in PSPACE. The
second reason is that, a priori, although we know that the counter graph is of exponential
size, we do not know explicitly its size. This is problematic when using classical NPSPACE
algorithms that guess some path in a graph of exponential size, where a counter bounded by
the size of the graph is needed to guarantee the termination of the procedure. In order to
overcome this, we also need a PSPACE procedure to obtain the actual size of the counter
graph. Recall that, as |C(λ∗)| = |V | · 2|Π| · (K∗ + 1)|Π| with K∗ = mR(λ∗), we only have to
determine the value of K∗. This is possible thanks to Proposition 27.
I Proposition 27. Given a quantitative game (G, v0), for all k ∈ N, for all J` with ` ∈
{1, . . . , N}, the set {λk(v) | v ∈ V J`} and the value mR(λk≥`) can be computed in PSPACE.
Proof sketch. The whole procedure works by induction on k, the steps in the computation of
the labeling function λ∗. Moreover, it exploits the structural evolution of the local fixpoints
formalized in Proposition 15: once a step is fixed, we proceed region by region, beginning
with the bottom region JN and then proceeding bottom-up by following the total order on I.
Let XJ` be a region, we aim at proving that {λk+1(v) | v ∈ V J`} and mR(λk+1≥` ) are
computable in PSPACE, assuming that (i) we know {λk(v) | v ∈ V J`}, and (ii) we can
compute {λk(v) | v ∈ V J′} for all J ′ > J` and mR(λk≥`) in PSPACE.
We first focus on the computation of λk+1 from λk. Let k∗` (resp. k∗`+1) be the step where
the fixpoint is reached for region XJ` (resp. XJ`+1). Recall that k∗`+1 < k∗` . When k ≤ k∗`+1
(resp. k > k∗` ), we have that λk+1(v) = λk(v), for each v ∈ V J` , by Lemma 16. The tricky
case in when k∗`+1 < k ≤ k∗` 3, let us focus on it.
3 Notice the little difference with the inequalities given in Lemma 16. When k = k∗` , we still need to
compute λk+1 to realize that the fixpoint is effectively reached.
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In this case, the computation of λk+1(v) from λk(v), for all v ∈ V Jn , relies on the
maximum of the cost of the λk-consistent plays (see Definition 13). Computing this maximum
is equivalent to guess the existence of lassoes with a certain cost in the counter graph C(λk≥`).
The size of these lassoes depends on the size of C(λk≥`) equal to |V | · 2|Π| · (K + 1)|Π| where
K = mR(λk≥`). Moreover, each lasso is guessed region by region. As we can compute in
PSPACE the value K and the sets {λk(v) | v ∈ V J′} for all J ′ ≥ J` by induction hypothesis,
we can also compute in PSPACE the maximum of the cost of the λk-consistent plays and thus
the set {λk+1(v) | v ∈ V J`}. The correctness of this approach relies on Proposition 15 which
ensures that the values of λ∗ have already reached a fixpoint for all the v ∈ V J′ such that
J ′ > J`. Once we have computed {λk+1(v) | v ∈ V J`} in PSPACE, it is clear that mR(λk+1≥` )
can also be computed in PSPACE because mR(λk+1≥` ) = max{mR(λ
k+1
` ),mR(λ
k+1
≥`+1)} (notice
that mR(λk+1≥`+1) = mR(λk≥`+1) because k > k∗`+1 and thus XJ`+1 has already reached its
local fixpoint and so the induction hypothesis can be used).
Notice that all these arguments hold because: (i) the value of mR(λk≥`) and any value
of λk(v) with v ∈ V ≥` (or of λk+1(v) with v ∈ V `) can be encoded in polynomial size
memory (by Theorem 23); (ii) the value of the maximal cost of λk-consistent plays is at
most exponential in the inputs (by Corollary 24); (iii) any set {λk(v) | v ∈ V J′}, J ′ ≥ J`
(or the set {λk+1(v) | v ∈ V J`}) is composed of at most |V | values which can be encoded
with polynomial size memory by (i), and (iv) we have a polynomial number of such values to
keep in memory. J
Proof of Proposition 26. Let (G, v0) be an initialized reachability game and let x, y ∈ (N ∪
{+∞})|Π| be two thresholds. Let (X , x0) be its extended game with x0 = (v0, I0). Let C(λ∗≥I0)
be the counter graph restricted to the arena X≥I0 and so |C(λ∗≥I0)| = |V | · 2
|Π| · (K0 + 1)|Π|
with K0 = mR(λ∗≥I0). Let us recall that K
0 can be computed (resp. encoded) in PSPACE
thanks to Proposition 27 (resp. Theorem 23).
We have to guess a lasso π = hgω in the counter graph C(λ∗≥I0) such that its corresponding
play ρX in the extended game satisfies the constraints, i.e., xi ≤ Costi(ρX) ≤ yi for all i ∈ Π.
The length L of π is at most max(max{yi | yi < +∞}, |C(λ∗≥I0)|) + 2 · |C(λ
∗
≥I0)| as the cycle
of π can appear after the constraints yi < +∞ are satisfied.
In order to have a PSPACE procedure, we cannot guess π entirely and we have to proceed
region by region. If I0 = J` for some ` ∈ {1, . . . , N}, we consider the region decomposition
π[`]π[`+ 1] . . . π[t] of π, with t ∈ {`, . . . , N}, where some sections π[m] may be empty.
We first guess the first vertex of the cycle g and then we guess successively π[`]π[`+ 1]
and so on. To guess π[m] with ` ∈ {m, . . . , t}, assuming it is not empty, we guess one by
one its vertices. To guess a vertex (v′, Jm, (c′i)i∈Π) we only have to keep its predecessor in
memory and to know the value λ∗(v′, Jm). So, we need to know {λ∗(v) | v ∈ V Jm}. Thanks
to Proposition 27, we can obtain this set in polynomial size memory and once we move to
another region, we can forget this set and compute the new one.
Additionally, we have a counter CL to count the length of π and for each player i ∈ Π we
have a counter Ci keeping track the current cost of player i along π. For all i ∈ Π, we have
that Ci, CL ≤ L. Henceforth, all these counters can be encoded with polynomial size memory.
Moreover, in addition to these counters, we currently maintain: (i) the first vertex of g, (ii)
the current vertex we are guessing, (iii) its predecessor and, (iv) the set {λ∗(v) | v ∈ V Jm}
(only |V | values which can be encoded in polynomial size memory by Theorem 23) if we are
guessing π[m]. As for (ii) and (iii) a vertex in the counter graph is composed of a vertex
of V , a subset I of Π and |Π| counter values which are at most exponential in the input
(Theorem 23), all this procedure can be done in PSPACE. J
T. Brihaye, V. Bruyère, A. Goeminne, J.-F. Raskin, and M. van den Bogaard 13:15
References
1 Nicolas Basset, Ismaël Jecker, Arno Pauly, Jean-François Raskin, and Marie van den Bogaard.
Beyond Admissibility: Dominance Between Chains of Strategies. In CSL, volume 119 of
LIPIcs, pages 10:1–10:22. Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik, 2018.
2 Dietmar Berwanger. Admissibility in Infinite Games. In STACS, volume 4393 of LNCS, pages
188–199. Springer, 2007.
3 Romain Brenguier, Lorenzo Clemente, Paul Hunter, Guillermo A. Pérez, Mickael Randour,
Jean-François Raskin, Ocan Sankur, and Mathieu Sassolas. Non-Zero Sum Games for Reactive
Synthesis. In LATA, volume 9618 of LNCS, pages 3–23. Springer, 2016.
4 Romain Brenguier, Arno Pauly, Jean-François Raskin, and Ocan Sankur. Admissibility in
Games with Imperfect Information (Invited Talk). In CONCUR, volume 85 of LIPIcs, pages
2:1–2:23. Schloss Dagstuhl–Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik, 2017.
5 Romain Brenguier, Guillermo A. Pérez, Jean-Francois Raskin, and Ocan Sankur. Admissibility
in Quantitative Graph Games. In FSTTCS, volume 65 of LIPIcs, pages 42:1–42:14, 2016.
6 Romain Brenguier, Jean-François Raskin, and Ocan Sankur. Assume-admissible synthesis.
In CONCUR, LIPIcs 42, pages 100–113. Schloss Dagstuhl–Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik,
2015.
7 Romain Brenguier, Jean-François Raskin, and Mathieu Sassolas. The complexity of admissib-
ility in Omega-regular games. In CSL-LICS, pages 23:1–23:10. ACM, 2014.
8 Thomas Brihaye, Véronique Bruyère, Julie De Pril, and Hugo Gimbert. On Subgame Perfection
in Quantitative Reachability Games. Logical Methods in Computer Science, 9(1), 2012.
9 Thomas Brihaye, Véronique Bruyère, Aline Goeminne, and Jean-François Raskin. Constrained
Existence Problem for Weak Subgame Perfect Equilibria with ω-Regular Boolean Objectives.
In GandALF, pages 16–29, 2018.
10 Thomas Brihaye, Véronique Bruyère, Aline Goeminne, and Jean-François Raskin. Constrained
existence problem for weak subgame perfect equilibria with omega-regular Boolean objectives.
CoRR, abs/1806.05544, 2018.
11 Thomas Brihaye, Véronique Bruyère, Noémie Meunier, and Jean-François Raskin. Weak
Subgame Perfect Equilibria and their Application to Quantitative Reachability. In CSL,
volume 41 of LIPIcs, pages 504–518. Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik,
2015.
12 Thomas Brihaye, Julie De Pril, and Sven Schewe. Multiplayer Cost Games with Simple Nash
Equilibria. In LFCS, volume 7734 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 59–73. Springer,
2013.
13 Véronique Bruyère. Computer Aided Synthesis: A Game-Theoretic Approach. In DLT, volume
10396 of LNCS, pages 3–35. Springer, 2017.
14 Véronique Bruyère, Stéphane Le Roux, Arno Pauly, and Jean-François Raskin. On the
Existence of Weak Subgame Perfect Equilibria. In FOSSACS, volume 10203 of LNCS, pages
145–161, 2017.
15 K. Chatterjee, T. A. Henzinger, and M. Jurdzinski. Games with secure equilibria. Theoretical
Computer Science, 365:67–82, 2006.
16 Krishnendu Chatterjee, Thomas A. Henzinger, and Nir Piterman. Strategy logic. Inf. Comput.,
208(6):677–693, 2010.
17 Rodica Condurache, Emmanuel Filiot, Raffaella Gentilini, and Jean-François Raskin. The
Complexity of Rational Synthesis. In ICALP, volume 55 of LIPIcs, pages 121:1–121:15. Schloss
Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik, 2016.
18 Emmanuel Filiot, Raffaella Gentilini, and Jean-François Raskin. Rational Synthesis Under
Imperfect Information. In LICS, pages 422–431. ACM, 2018.
19 Dana Fisman, Orna Kupferman, and Yoad Lustig. Rational Synthesis. In TACAS, volume
6015 of LNCS, pages 190–204. Springer, 2010.
CONCUR 2019
13:16 The Complexity of Subgame Perfect Equilibria in Quantitative Reachability Games
20 János Flesch, Jeroen Kuipers, Ayala Mashiah-Yaakovi, Gijs Schoenmakers, Eilon Solan, and
Koos Vrieze. Perfect-Information Games with Lower-Semicontinuous Payoffs. Mathematics of
Operation Research, 35:742–755, 2010.
21 Erich Grädel and Michael Ummels. Solution Concepts and Algorithms for Infinite Multiplayer
Games. In New Perspectives on Games and Interaction, volume 4, pages 151–178. Amsterdam
University Press, 2008.
22 Orna Kupferman, Giuseppe Perelli, and Moshe Y. Vardi. Synthesis with Rational Environments.
In EUMAS, LNCS 8953, pages 219–235. Springer, 2014.
23 Fabio Mogavero, Aniello Murano, and Moshe Y. Vardi. Reasoning About Strategies. In
FSTTCS 2010, volume 8 of LIPIcs, pages 133–144. Schloss Dagstuhl–Leibniz-Zentrum fuer
Informatik, 2010.
24 J. F. Nash. Equilibrium points in n-person games. In PNAS, volume 36, pages 48–49. National
Academy of Sciences, 1950.
25 Martin J. Osborne. An introduction to game theory. Oxford Univ. Press, 2004.
26 A. Pnueli and R. Rosner. On the Synthesis of a Reactive Module. In POPL, pages 179–190.
ACM Press, 1989.
27 Michael Ummels. Rational Behaviour and Strategy Construction in Infinite Multiplayer Games.
In FSTTCS, volume 4337 of LNCS, pages 212–223. Springer, 2006.
28 Michael Ummels. The Complexity of Nash Equilibria in Infinite Multiplayer Games. In
FOSSACS, volume 4962 of LNCS, pages 20–34. Springer, 2008.
29 Michael Ummels and Dominik Wojtczak. The Complexity of Nash Equilibria in Limit-Average
Games. In CONCUR, volume 6901 of LNCS, pages 482–496. Springer, 2011.
